Taiwan: The canary in the South China Sea coal mine

China had at least one backer in rejecting the South China Sea ruling earlier this month: Taiwan. The Hague’s Permanent Court of Appeals decided none of the land features in the sea qualified as islands, including the Taiwan-administered island of Itu-aba (also known as Taiping) in the Spratly Islands, the largest natural island in the South China Sea.

By calling the 110-acre Itu-aba a “rock,” the international court denied Taiwan the 200-mile economic zone (EEZ) in the waters surrounding the island, which allows for exploration and use of its natural resources. Shortly after the decision, Taiwan sent a warship to patrol the area “to display Taiwan people’s resolve in defending the national interest,” said Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. Taiwanese lawmakers and fisherman also made trips to the island, which includes an airstrip, a hospital, and a post office.

While Tsai denounced the Hague’s decision, she’s careful to differentiate her issues from China’s (See “Sea no evil” in the Aug. 6, 2016 issue of WORLD). Taiwan disputes the ruling that Itu-aba is a rock, but does not claim the “historic waters” of the South China Sea or mention the infamous “nine-dash line.” China’s claims to 90 percent of the South China Sea are based on a 1947 map, originally drawn by the Republic of China’s (ROC) leaders, with a U-shaped line demarcating its claims in the sea. After losing the Chinese civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Nationalists escaped to Taiwan and claimed to govern China from the island.

Tsai’s reluctance to tie Taiwan’s past to China’s represents a growing trend on the island of 23 million: Residents, especially the younger generation, do not feel any connection to mainland China. In 2014, thousands of students filled the streets to protest a proposed trade agreement with China in what became known as the Sunflower Student Movement. A 2015 poll found 60 percent of respondents considered themselves Taiwanese, compared to 32 percent who considered themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese, and a measly 3 percent who considered themselves Chinese. In 1992, only 17 percent self-identified as Taiwanese.

Cross-strait tensions have increased in recent months since Tsai, a member of the pro-independence Democratic Progress Party, came to power. In June, the Chinese government said it stopped communication with Taiwan because the new president did not recognize the “one China” principle, which states that while there is only one China, both the CCP and ROC claim to be its true ruler. This denies the possibility of independence for Taiwan, even though the island has a completely separate government, currency, and legal system.

Jerome Keating, author and former professor of National Taiwan University, noted that China is insistent on reunification with Taiwan because of the island’s geostrategic importance in the region. Besides the headache of having an American ally so close to its shore, the Chinese navy must either pass between Taiwan and Japan to the north or between Taiwan and the Philippines to the south in order to access the Pacific Ocean. If China controlled Taiwan, it would have a straight shot into the great wide Pacific. More importantly, the waters along China’s shore are shallow, making it difficult for submarines to move undetected. But Taiwan’s east coast has one of the deepest entry points into the Western Pacific. If China built a submarine base in the Taiwanese city of Hualien, it would have access to the deep sea and could build a blue water navy.

But Keating believes that if China actually tried to take Taiwan by military force, neighboring Japan would come to Taiwan’s aid. With Taiwan’s 200-mile EEZ, China could essentially choke off Japan’s access to the rest of the world.

“China is always threatening to attack Taiwan. … They can rattle their sabers all they want, but Japan also has its saber,” Keating said.

Japan’s post-War World II constitution consigns its military to a purely defensive role, but Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is pushing through a bill that would reinterpret the constitution to allow Japan to come to the aid of its allies.

The United States also pledged in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act that it would provide the military assistance necessary “to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” But the vague wording has led to debates as to whether the United States would be willing to start a war with China over Taiwan.

Bill Stanton, director of the Center for Asia Policy at National Tsing Hua University in Taiwan, believes if China launched an unprovoked attack, the United States would come to Taiwan’s aid.

“I think we would have to, or else we would cease being the U.S.,” said Stanton, the de facto U.S. ambassador to Taiwan from 2009 to 2012. “I think if we didn’t, then our whole alliance relationship in Asia would collapse because Taiwan is a canary in the coal mine. If you allow the canary to die, then everybody flees.”

Stanton noted the vibrant democracy in Taiwan is what the United States had hoped for—and failed to achieve—in other parts of the world: “Here we have a functioning democracy, how can the U.S. walk away from that?”