Can better regulations prevent pilot suicide?

As search and recovery teams continue to comb the mountainside in the French Alps where a suicidal pilot crashed a Germanwings jet last month, aviation experts are scrambling to come up with regulations to prevent another such horrific tragedy in the future. Skeptics warn no amount of in-air rules can ultimately protect passengers from a pilot intent on doing harm. Others suggest airlines should focus on improved mental health screenings to ensure a suicidal pilot never makes it through the cockpit door in the first place.

Black box recorders and investigations show co-pilot Andreas Lubitz deliberately crashed Germanwings flight 4U 9525 on March 24, killing himself and all 149 other people on board. In the weeks before, he researched suicide and methods to secure the cockpit door.

In response to public concern about a pilot suicide on a U.S. carrier, Department of Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx said during a recent briefingthe U.S. government sets the world’s “gold standard” for aviation safety. The current safety rulesfor all airlines operating in U.S. airspace were introduced after the 9/11 terror attacks.

One U.S. and Canadian safety standard not yet required in Europe is the “Rule of Two,” which mandates two authorized personnel in the cockpit at all times. Several European airlines, including Germanwings’ parent company Lufthansa, instituted the Rule of Two immediately after it became clear Lubitz was able to crash the plane in part because he was alone in the cockpit.

Europe is considering making that requirement mandatory, but governments and European airlines also are questioning their standards for certifying pilots as mentally stable.

The emerging profile of Lubitz—young, well-trained, sporty, and professional—indicates he actually may have been unfit to fly. He had a known history of battling “severe depression” and “suicidal tendencies.” His pilot’s license referenced a physical or mental health condition, which meant Lubitz should have had “specific regular medical examination.” But Lufthansa CEO Carsten Spohr revealed a worrying months-long gap in Lubitz’s training six years ago which resolved with his return to training. He subsequently “passed all medical tests but also his flight training, all flying tests, and checks.”

Patient privacy laws and the airline’s desire to get a return on its investment in Lubitz’s training may have contributed to the decision to allow him to continue flying.

Andrew Mumford, a British pilot who used to fly an air ambulance in Scotland, told me current European standards for earning a pilot medical certificate are pretty lax: “To fly commercially in Europe, we have to have a Class 1 medical. There is not much emphasis on mental health in medicals. The only reference is a series of Yes/No questions that the candidate fills in at the start of the examination.”

Though aware of occupational health departments in airlines that check on pilot well-being, Mumford said neither he nor the pilots he worked with had to go through any medical checks other than the basic annual exam.

The Germanwings crash was the first time a European airline has had to deal with a pilot suicide. Worldwide, not counting crashes caused by jihadist hijackers, only seven or eight pilot suicides have led to crashes on commercial flights since 1982. All but the latest crash were on African and Asian airlines. Pilot suicide remains a hypothesis for the March 2014 disappearance over the Indian Ocean of Malaysia Airlines flight 370 and its 239 passengers.

Mumford currently flies in Africa for Missionary Aviation Fellowship Europe and said the pilot well-being and mental assessment he now receives is “over and above what an ordinary commercial pilot would have to undergo.” Although beneficial, Mumford does not see regulations as the answer: “These situations will be very hard to prevent from occurring in the future [but] to always have a second crew member in the cockpit is clearly an attempt to minimize the opportunity.”

The German conservative daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung said “ultimately Lufthansa’s system failed.” But given Lubitz went to some lengths to conceal his illness, the paper questioned whether any system could ever pre-empt someone’s intentions.

Mercedes Valle, a Spanish doctor who works in Madrid said no one could have known Lubitz intended to crash his plane that day.

“In the past I’ve seen the impact such a person can have at the wheel of a school bus or even a car,” she said. “Fortunately, it’s a very rare occurrence.”

The Associated Press contributed to this report.