Terms and conditions

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MARY REICHARD, HOST: It’s Tuesday the 23rd of June. So glad to have you along for today's edition of The World and Everything in It! 

Good morning, I’m Mary Reichard.

NICK EICHER, HOST: And I’m Nick Eicher.

First up: peace talks.

After months of war, sanctions, military strikes, and threats to global shipping, the United States and Iran are at the negotiating table.

The Trump administration says talks in Switzerland produced meaningful progress. Iran reportedly has agreed to allow international nuclear inspectors into the country. In return, the United States has temporarily eased some oil sanctions on Iran. 

But the biggest questions remain unresolved.

REICHARD: Iran still insists on its right to enrich uranium. The future of its nuclear program is unsettled. And critics argue the administration may be giving up leverage before securing lasting concessions.

Joining us now is Janatan Sayeh. He’s a research analyst focused on Iran at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He was born and raised in Tehran and closely follows both the Iranian regime and the views of ordinary Iranians.

EICHER: Good morning, Janatan.

JANATAN SAYEH: Good morning, great to be with you.

EICHER: Well, strip away all of the press conferences and the diplomatic language, and doing that, can you assess who you think got the better deal over the last week: Iran or the U.S.?

SAYEH: Well, having looked through the 14 articles of the MOU, it is tough to narrow down precisely what concessions the Islamic Republic is providing. 

On the other hand, you see the three layers of leverage established by the Trump administration: maximum pressure, the naval blockade, and military confrontation, all three of them seem to be effectively abandoned under just an MOU, which is not even close to the comprehensive deal. 

So it's tough to say whether the Islamic Republic is even really providing any incentives on their end.

EICHER: How much leverage do you think reopening oil exports gives back to the regime?

SAYEH: It is crucial for them, because if you look at the nature of the sanction waiver, it was not just a temporary limited waiver in a sense that it does not only allow the regime to sell oil, it even allows them to repatriate the funds, meaning the waiver also includes the bank transactions. And the Islamic Republic is still producing oil, but more importantly, they have plenty on their vessels that couldn't leave the ports because of blockade, and now they have the capability to leave. 

From the regime's perspective, this is effectively a very lucrative deal. That said, I think we're all eyeing what goes beyond that, which would be the $300 billion that's noted in there. The details remain unclear as what form of an incentive that would be. And parallel to that is lifting of all UN sanctions, secondary sanctions, primary sanctions, and that's what's also listed in the MOU. 

And I'll conclude with this: one article in the MOU says discussions surrounding the nuclear file will only begin once all the other articles are addressed, meaning the regime would have access to all these funds, even before they start negotiating over the nuclear file, let alone concessions.

EICHER: Before we leave the MOU, what would you say is the one thing that you need to see in the next 60 days before you could call this a strategic success for the U.S.?

SAYEH: We've seen the Islamic Republic put more and more on the table, demanding them to be addressed, and one of them is the issue of proxies. We saw how the regime is effectively driving a wedge between Jerusalem and Washington, somehow forcing Israelis to refrain from responding to Hezbollah fires in southern Lebanon, and on one hand, you saw how Washington, on one end, is really keen on having a deal with the regime, and they're trying to do everything in their power to somehow make amends with the Islamic Republic. 

Now, within that context, once you see the provocations coming from Hezbollah in the next few days, I'm watching really closely as to how Israel is allowed to respond to that from from a U.S. perspective. Of course, they're a sovereign nation, they would have to go address it as they see fit, but the U.S. response to Israelis addressing the threat in southern Lebanon, I think, would be crucial the next 60 days.

REICHARD: Well, speaking of regimes, one thing that you've argued repeatedly, Jonathan, is that Americans often confuse Iran with the Iranian regime. So what does the average Iranian see when he or she looks at the events of the last several months, say?

SAYEH: The most pivotal moment was the ceasefire itself, when Iranians were protesting in January, and were told that help is on the way, and sure enough, help was in fact on the way.

So the early stages of the war, to be fair, really went after the internal security apparatus, the repression sites that have killed many Iranians, but that was concluded relatively shortly because of the Islamic Republic attacking the Strait of Hormuz and oil prices and other military reasons behind that. 

But nonetheless, once Iranians saw the ceasefire, and now they see this administration not only somehow legitimizing this regime by negotiating with them, but actually unfreezing all these assets that are directly going to fund these personnel that have committed all these heinous crimes, certainly feel alienated, but at the same time a lot can happen in the next two and a half years under the Trump administration, we saw what happened a year ago. 

So this is not to say hope is absolutely destroyed, but the concerns remain with the Iranian public as to who's their international ally, whether it's Israel or a Trump administration or broadly the U.S. or the average American.

EICHER: So, Jonathan, let's talk about the question underneath all the others. 

After everything that's happened, the war, the strikes, the negotiations, how close would you say Iran is today to having a nuclear weapon?

SAYEH: The critical step in developing a nuclear weapon is enriching uranium above 90%. So, enrichment is key, and Operation Midnight Hammer in June of 2025 was the only instance in the past two to three decades, where the regime was no longer enriching uranium. So that was the most critical step in curbing the regime's capabilities to produce a nuclear weapon. That is, that is not to say we've eliminated the intent. The nature of the Islamic Republic being increasingly more paranoid is going to pursue that one way or another. 

But when it comes to the capabilities, that was the most effective operation in curbing that.

REICHARD: Jonathan Sayeh is a research analyst focused on Iran at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. His work examines Iran's domestic politics, regional influence, and nuclear ambitions. 

Jonathan, thank you so much.

SAYEH: Thank you for having me.

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