Iran’s weak spot

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MYRNA BROWN, HOST: Coming next: the standoff with Iran enters a new phase.

Talks are stalled, tensions remain high in the Strait of Hormuz, and both sides are signaling they’re in no hurry to back down. 

But some analysts say the real story isn’t happening at sea or at the negotiating table—it’s inside Iran itself.

Joining us is Janatan Sayeh, a research analyst with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

NICK EICHER, HOST: Janatan, good morning.

SAYEH: Good morning, great to be with you.

EICHER: Well, your argument is that the real story is what’s going on inside Iran. So maybe tell us what we’re missing.

SAYEH: The reason I think the real story is what's going on inside Iran is going beyond just the human rights angle. That was the main pressure point against the Islamic Republic, and has been, it's truly the real existential threat. 

And from a policy angle, it was used, in part, at least as a justification for initiating this conflict. That's what Trump stated during his State of the Union, he reiterated that the first day of the war on February 28. So just to see that the Iranian people angle is not part of discussion when we're talking about any potential ceasefire re-extension with Tehran is greatly concerning, because we might be alienating the main leverage that we have against the regime, which is not bombs or economic blockades, but comes down to how we'd be able to mobilize and inspire the masses inside the country.

BROWN: Well, right now, talks appear stalled, Janatan, and both sides are blaming each other. From your vantage point, is this a temporary breakdown—or something deeper?

SAYEH: Two ways of looking at it, and whether time is on America's side or on Tehran side, but the interesting angle here is that we saw the Islamic Republic give a new proposal. And interestingly enough, they have scaled back from their maximalist demands, so initially they would just send proposals that would be so comprehensive it would talk about the Strait of Hormuz, it would talk about the nuclear file proxies and all angles. 

All of a sudden they’re shifting it, saying we want to have only one agreement in the short term with the United States, so they can remove this blockade. And that's what's been interesting. It's indicative of the fact that that economic pressure is working and the regime officials are concerned about that. 

So I think the question here is, is Washington going to disaggregate and separate the different talking points? Just on one hand, resolve the Strait of Hormuz with Iran and then postpone the nuclear talks? Or is Washington finally realizing that this economic blockade might give them even more leverage, so why not flip the script even further onto Iran and impose some sort of a surrender?

BROWN: You’ve also written about divisions inside Iran’s leadership. How significant are those right now?

SAYEH: They have always been there. Different pillars of the regime continue to disagree with one another. Of course, you have the “hard line” body that's controlled mostly by the IRGC. Then you have the diplomatic machine. 

But that said, the difference here is there is no supreme authority that could mediate between the different pillars, which is why, on one hand, we might be seeing contradictory messages coming from Tehran. First they initiated the talks, and then afterwards they backtrack, saying we're not going to be reappearing in Pakistan to continue them. That's going to be the main challenge when we're dealing with them. 

But what's on my mind is whether Washington can somehow use those rifts to further exploit the divisions within the regime. I don't think we can replicate a Venezuela model, and this is not to suggest we can find someone that's going to be more rational to work with, it's more so to say, looking at the regime long term, there's a lot of grievances against the hard line apparatus that we can somehow leverage to pursue regime collapse.

EICHER: Janatan, as we wrap up, if this conflict were somehow to end in a deal that stabilizes oil flows or even sets the nuclear program way back, but still leaves the regime largely intact, who's the winner?

SAYEH: Undoubtedly, the Islamic Republic, simply because all these measures that you mentioned such as the nuclear program or the Strait of Hormuz, are guarantees that the regime thinks it could keep it afloat. So if it was finally able to use some of these different assets just so it can stay in power, that means it's won, and that means its strategy worked of coercing so many different diplomatic measures and military assets solely for survival. 

And what we would see in the region, of course, would never be an end to how the Islamic Republic behaves; it's just postponing the problems. I would even challenge the notion that we can get behavior change from them in any capacity. 

And of course, the real loser of that would be, number one, the Iranian people that really stood up on the side of democracy and were aligned with the United States and Israel for trying to pursue freedom. And close to that would be our Persian Gulf state allies in Israel.

Ultimately, you're talking about a regime that's not going to give up its malign ambitions of wanting to support terrorism in the region, and that terrorism is not limited to the Middle East. It has extended itself on American soil. So of course, another implication would be for the average American.

BROWN: Janatan Sayeh is a research analyst with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 

Janatan, thank you for your time.

SAYEH: Thank you for having me.

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