After the war

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NICK EICHER, HOST: Joining us now is Janatan Sayeh, a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 

Born and raised in Tehran, he brings a unique perspective to the complex web of Iranian domestic politics and its global threat network. 

Janatan, good morning. 

JANATAN SAYEH: Good morning. Great to be with you.

EICHER: Well, listen, I’ve really been looking forward to talking with you ever since the news broke late Tuesday night of a ceasefire in place, Janatan. 

Of course, we are already seeing reports of continued attacks in parts of the region—even a good bit of disagreement about what the deal actually covers.

So let me ask you this: when you see something like this, where both sides are able to come out and claim victory like this, what does it usually say about how genuine or stable it might be?

SAYEH: I don’t think anyone was surprised that both sides were looking to de-escalate; they had an incentive.

But that said, when I look at the two demands—and here, we’d be comparing the 10 points from Iran versus the 15 that were proposed by the United States—I cannot identify any overlap of anything. I see contradictions after contradictions.

So to phrase this as a stepping stone, or the first building block for long-term peace, might be over-exaggerating the content of it. And as we’ve seen so far, Tehran is again blocking the strait, and the rhetoric is far from de-escalation.

EICHER: Well, is there anything that you see right now—anything that you can imagine, Janatan—that would give you confidence that this would hold up, that we might actually be done here?

SAYEH: As much as I’d like to be optimistic, it is challenging.

But perhaps one way of looking at it is maybe Trump does not even want a long-term deal with Tehran. Perhaps a ceasefire that would last for months or years—until he’s out of office—would theoretically suffice, because he says that the main challenge with Tehran was their nuclear program, and he’s destroyed it—or so he claims.

But that said, he’s a dealmaker. He wants to go down in history, so he has an incentive—but he’s not as desperate for a long-term deal at the momoent. 

EICHER: Well, Janatan, I’d like to go back to something that you said earlier—kind of llooking at the terms each side is staking out. Clearly they’re not anywhere near close to one another. 

But in some sense, I have to say, I’m kind of surprised by the position Iran is taking after what has been a punishing month militarily, they’re still making very sweeping demands.

So if you take the nuclear issue—the U.S. is saying no enrichment, that’s a red line. Iran insists on the right to enrichment. How do you square a circle like that?

SAYEH: You’re right to find Iran’s demand, frankly, outrageous. They’re getting, if I may say, greedier or more ambitious with their demands.

As to how you can straighten that out when it comes to the nuclear agreement—listen, Tehran time and time again has said enrichment is their red line.

Now, if they think they can survive another bombing campaign, what is stopping them—or what is really compelling them—to negotiate on that?

So if I’m sitting there as a regime official in Tehran, if every once in a while we get attacked, but we survive it, then the U.S. asks for a deal, we reject, and it turns into again cat and mouse. I don’t have an incentive to offer compromises. 

It comes down to the real threat, which is not bombs, but the Iranian people. So long as there is not internal unrest, the Islamic Republic does not feel threatened.

EICHER: Well, let’s step back from the negotiations, Janatan, they haven’t even begun yet—not til Saturday anyway.

But I think the bigger question is: what has this war accomplished?

To me, it seems that it’s accomplished quite a bit—but five weeks of very heavy fighting, very one-sided heavy fighting. Do you think that anything has actually been solved though at this point?

SAYEH: Solved, no—but postponed, yes. But I'm not sure if that was Trump's ambitions. 

So I would say there are three main pillars that have been greatly implicated in the war.

Number one, nuclear. There hasn’t been much reporting on it, but Israeli and American strikes actually did go after other nuclear facilities—heavy water reactors, and again, it was really building on the successes of Operation Midnight Hammer.

But more important than that were the ballistic missile capabilities. So when Israel and the United States combined—taking out about 20,000 targets, most of which have been missiles—in addition to that, they’ve depleted Iranian stockpiles. 

So of course, the Islamic Republic militarily is nowhere near where it was months ago.

And third, which is very interesting, is specifically Israeli operations—and not American—that have been taking out the repression infrastructure, internal security of Iran like never before.

I look at all these bases that were used to brutalize Iranians—one of them was actually a police station that I was detained in in 2009. I see it destroyed. 

But that said, this apparatus has lost its infrastructure—but the forces still remain.

So I would characterize these three things as the main, I guess short-term achievements—but none of which are resolved.

EICHER: Well, let me ask about the people of Iran, Janatan. You said earlier that so long as the people don’t rise up, the regime feels no threat. 

What about this call from the U.S. to the people of Iran to rise up? How does that happen with a deal being worked out with the regime—and the people having no representation at the table?

SAYEH: You’re right to point that out, because ultimately the main leverage against the regime is millions of Iranians—the majority of the population—that wants to see this regime gone.

It would be certainly disheartening if a meaningful ceasefire were to be reached, or if there was actually an agreement enacted between Tehran and Washington.

And the main challenge with that is just demoralization.

So Iranians were massacred in January—about 40,000 people within 48 hours. But the hopes were still high once the war started, meaning that there’s still anticipation that there might be some way that America would facilitate the conditions for Iranians to rise up.

But if he’s prioritizing opening up the strait over neutralizing the main threat from Tehran, Iranians are going to lose that hope—and apathy is the most dangerous thing.

We’re not going to see a rally-around-the-flag effect. Iranians are not going to all of a sudden support the regime because America abandoned them—but they’re going to just become pessimistic and nihilistic. They’re not going to mobilize—and that’s going to be the main challenge when you’re engaging with Tehran: losing that leverage.

EICHER: Well, Janatan, you are from Iran, I know you maintain contact with people inside the country. 

Before we go—what are you hearing?

SAYEH: That the terror machine continues to operate.

A couple of weeks ago, they started public hangings again for political crimes—and this is something I witnessed growing up there too. And executions are on the rise, we’re hearing numbers as high as 500 within two months since January 2026.

So all the signs are pointing at a regime that’s going to consolidate power even further.

If this war fails to somehow get systemic change, we’re going to see an Islamist version of North Korea in the Middle East—and it’s the most dangerous combination of two ideologies.

EICHER: Janatan Sayeh, Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 

Thanks for talking with me.

SAYEH: Thank you for having me.

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