Saving Social Contract Theory

Social contract theory is in jeopardy, but it can be salvaged—this is the argument of political science professor Paul R. DeHart’s important new book, The Social Contract in the Ruins. Social contract theory states that a legitimate government rests on the consent of the governed, but increasingly it seems that consent is not enough. The problem with forms of “conventional social contract theory” is that they “fail to provide coherent accounts of justice or moral norms more generally.” Society needs moral norms that transcend the will, agreement, and conventions of community. DeHart wants to reconstruct social contract theory on a better foundation—rejecting conventionalism and replacing it with moral and metaphysical realism.

DeHart attacks what he labels “conventional social contract theory” for its voluntaristic basis of obligation. Voluntarism—a conception of morality that is based on the will without regard to any prior and transcendent good—offers no resources to norm human behavior. And voluntaristic contractarianism cannot provide the resources to engender the commitment to keep promises and agreements, which is essential for a political theory centered on consent. This means that political contractarianism, on its own, is incoherent. DeHart attempts to lay an alternative foundation to save social contract theory.

He argues that one can affirm both the metaphysical and moral realism of classical natural law alongside the political principle of consent (i.e., the necessity of the consent of the governed for legitimate government). He wants to defend the principle of consent, to “rebuild a different sort of social contract theory from amid the ruins.” DeHart explains that many theorists pit social contract (or consent) theory against moral and metaphysical realism, assuming one has to choose sides. He wants to present a third way that envisions how these can be harmonized.

DeHart’s primary enemies in this work are William of Ockham (d. 1347) and Thomas Hobbes (d. 1679). He also addresses the ideas of John Locke (d. 1704) as well as a number of other thinkers. Most readers will find his critique of John Rawls (d. 2002) and other recent figures a bit convoluted and meandering, but his take on the tensions and contradictions in Locke’s thought is illuminating.

DeHart tries to retrieve Catholic Thomistic principles, but the primary heroes in his argument are Richard Hooker (d. 1600) and Johannes Althusius (d. 1638). Their inclusion will assuage Protestant concerns that this is simply an attack on Protestant thought, which often gets blamed for all modernity’s ills. Furthermore, DeHart makes a qualified defense of the American founding against accusations that it was primarily inspired by modern, anti-realist conceptions.

The Framers of America, DeHart admits, spoke of a social compact and consent. However, they combined this with a commitment to natural law. DeHart explains that these are not in conflict. This leads him to his most fascinating material on Aristotle. A common misunderstanding is that a social contract theory of politics is in conflict with Aristotle’s political theory. But, DeHart explains, this is because many take Aristotle’s portrayal of the polis as a “natural” whole and conflate it with his understanding of “organic” wholes, which are at odds with associations made by covenant. DeHart analyzes how Aristotle distinguished “organic” and “natural” and argues that one can thus countenance how Aristotelian political theory could be “amenable to political societies constructed through consent.” One can conceive of a political body formed by social contract as an “associational natural whole,” even if it is not “organic.” Aristotle’s claim about the “naturalness” of political association is entirely compatible, argues DeHart, with an understanding of political order emerging through human consent. DeHart is not saying that Aristotle was himself a contractarian; rather, DeHart believes that Aristotle’s commitment to the idea of the polis as a natural whole is not inherently at odds with the idea that political association can be constructed through consent. So, the American constitutional order and Aristotle are not fundamentally at odds because in Aristotle’s own thinking about politics, “natural” and constructed-through-consent are not inherently at odds. This lays the conceptual groundwork for a rapprochement between social contract theories and Aristotelian principles.

As mentioned above, the two heroes of this work are Althusius and Hooker, who were “thoroughly grounded in classical thought and yet committed to covenant and consent.” Althusius, explains DeHart, is the one who first laid out a thoroughly covenantal account of political order, with consent as a necessary condition for all political associations among humans. However, Althusius “weds the covenantal foundation of all political authority to a substantially classical understanding of natural law.” Therefore, Althusius’ model is especially praised for its ability to salvage consent theory. According to DeHart, Hooker also remained committed to classical natural law principles even as he provided an early account of a “state of nature,” which would become essential in all social contract theories. Hooker’s political vision, therefore, provides the “main lineaments of Lockean social contract theory” prior to both Hobbes and Locke.

DeHart laments that it was neither Althusius’ nor Hooker’s model which became the dominant justification of state authority. What DeHart labels “conventional social contract theory” is inspired by Hobbesian and Lockean theories, which are wedded to nominalist metaphysics and voluntaristic metaethics.

Since moral voluntarism is “self-referentially incoherent,” it is not a viable foundation of morality and politics. This renders conventional social contract theory fatally flawed, since it attempts to combine a metaphysical nominalism with a theory of moral obligation.

The social contract is not going anywhere in modern political theory. But we should strive to ground the social contract in a worldview that renders political obligation coherent and provides norms for human action. No individual or political community is absolute, with its will and conventions standing outside of judgment. Consent, even though it offers legitimacy to contemporary political orders, is not sufficient. We need reality, the good, and a moral law-giver. DeHart successfully reconnects social contract theory with those things. Let us hope that his account helps kill conventional social contract theory that continues to keep them apart.