Keeping Hong Kong free

STEP ACROSS the border from Shenzhen, China, into Hong Kong, and you enter a different world—one where baby formula is safe to drink, where a search on Google brings up historical facts silenced in China, and where up until recently you could find books criticizing even the Chinese president.

Small signs of divergence from China’s norm: Hong Kong residents drive on the left-hand side of streets named “Queen Victoria” or “Baker,” remnants of British rule from 1842 to 1997. Foreign businessmen are a typical sight, and many Hong Kongers speak English along with their mother tongue of Cantonese. Young people post their uncensored political thoughts on Facebook (which is banned in China) and give up their seats to elders on the subway (an uncommon practice in China).

A greater sign of divergence: the Chinese Communist Party’s restrained response to the 2014 Umbrella Movement protests, where tens of thousands of people filled the typically busy thoroughfare in Hong Kong’s central business district. They demonstrated for the opportunity to choose their leaders democratically, to fix the increasing economic disparity, and to maintain the unique values of their city. Rather than violently quashing the protests, Chinese authorities let them play out while refusing the protesters’ demands.

While the Umbrella Movement did not gain a political victory, the protests awakened a generation. Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, which for the time being retains administrative authority, vetoed an undemocratic election reform package that Beijing desired. September’s legislative elections saw a record turnout, with six anti-China “localists” winning seats, including a former Umbrella Movement leader. On Sept. 28 activists opened yellow umbrellas to commemorate the two-year anniversary of the movement.

But even as Hong Kong residents continue to press for democracy and autonomy, many now worry how much longer their society, with its different political, legal, and economic system, can coexist with the Communist power.

IN THE 1997 SINO-BRITISH agreement, China promised to grant Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy for 50 years, after which Hong Kong would fully rejoin China. At first, this “one country, two systems” policy seemed to work well, as China largely let Hong Kong be. But today, as China rises in economic power and confidence, Communist leaders seem less interested in catering to Hong Kong’s uniqueness and more eager to control the region.

In a 1997 article published just before the handover, WORLD summed up the expected tension: “Hong Kong seems likely to show in microcosm the difficulty of combining economic freedom with totalitarian rule.” Some residents believed Beijing would respect Hong Kong’s autonomy and hoped the influence of free trade would lead China to greater democratization. Others worried that Beijing would clamp down on free speech, indoctrinate students, and shutter churches. Some churches even held training sessions to prepare Christians to maintain their faith if they were pushed underground.

Jeffrey Wasserstrom, a Chinese history professor at the University of California, Irvine, visited a Hong Kong university nine months before the handover for a screening of The Gate of Heavenly Peace, a documentary about the Tiananmen Square massacre. After the film, students asked, “Do you think we’ll face tanks on the streets if we protest in the future?” Wasserstrom told the students that while he wasn’t sure if that would happen, he did think sensitive films like this documentary would be outlawed.

After the handover, Wasserstrom was surprised to find that one movie theater showed The Gate of Heavenly Peace for an entire month. People were free to say what they wished. They traveled freely and could criticize the government as before. Church worship continued unfettered, with Chinese religious officials even befriending Hong Kong pastors and inviting them to partner with the government-approved Three-Self church in China—a mission field previously closed to Hong Kong churches.

“Initially, a lot of us were surprised about how slowly Beijing moved to stifle things in Hong Kong,” Wasserstrom told me. “They didn’t want it to stop being as economically thriving as it was, so the economics and the politics were always intertwined.” Under British rule, Hong Kong had grown into a booming financial hub with a GDP that was 16 percent of China’s. Once Hong Kong returned to Chinese control, Beijing authorities gained tax revenue and relied on Hong Kong for its international currency and access to global markets.

WHILE THINGS STARTED out much better than expected, cracks began to emerge. Even before the handover, Wasserstrom caught a glimpse of the type of pressures Hong Kongers would face under China: The documentary showing coincided with China’s National Day holiday, and some student leaders skipped the screening to attend a reception held by Beijing officials, thinking it would be more beneficial for their future. “I try to remember both—that there wasn’t an instant blocking of alternative speech, but the pressure existed that if you want to have a smooth economic future, you might want to be cautious with your politics,” Wasserstrom said.

As Hong Kong grows increasingly dependent on China, China’s influence on society grows. Today, half of Hong Kong exports end up in China and a fifth of its bank assets go toward Chinese loans. Chinese tourism and retail spending make up 10 percent of Hong Kong’s GDP. Those hoping to strike it rich in Hong Kong need to cozy up to Chinese officials for a slice of the Chinese marketplace.

In addition, some Chinese state-owned enterprises in Hong Kong instruct employees how to vote. Wealthy Chinese companies buy out newspapers to ensure the pro-Beijing viewpoints are heard. Pastors keep silent on political issues because they wish to maintain their relationship with China’s church.

Politically, the first major blowup occurred in 2002, when Beijing asked Hong Kong’s then-Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa to draft an anti-subversion law. Locals were upset to find the proposed law would curtail freedom of speech and ban organizations Beijing disliked. In 2003, about 500,000 people took to the streets in protest, resulting in the withdrawal of the bill and Tung’s resignation two years later.

Christian schools felt a pushback in 2004, when an education law stated that all schools must set up management committees and churches could only nominate 60 percent of committee members. The rest would be made up of teachers, alumni, parents, and community members. The law’s fiercest critic, former Cardinal Joseph Zen, brought the policy to the courts on the grounds that Hong Kong’s Basic Law granted religious groups the freedom to run schools. For seven years he fought the education law in court, conducting a three-day fast when the case lost its final appeal in 2011. “The church is submissive to the government now, they are not free anymore,” Zen recently said. “It is simply ridiculous.”

FAST-FORWARD to today, and Hong Kong’s freedoms and autonomy are deteriorating at a faster rate. While China had promised that Hong Kong could develop its democracy without interference, it changed course in 2014. China announced an election reform package that would allow a committee filled with Beijing loyalists to choose the two or three candidates on the 2017 ballot for chief executive. Citizens disgruntled with this faux democratic election then launched the 79-day Umbrella Movement protest.

Yet through the protests, Hong Kong residents were also expressing their frustrations with a government many saw as favoring businesses over people. On one hand, Hong Kong tops the 2016 Index of Economic Freedom, 10 spots ahead of the United States. A transparent legal system, a simple tax code, and a straightforward business startup process have helped Hong Kong grow and maintain its economic edge.

At the same time, Hong Kong is one of the most expensive cities in the world and faces one of the widest income gaps. A million dollars buys only 215 square feet in the city, compared with 366 square feet in New York.

Several factors contribute to the astronomical housing prices. The government owns all the land in Hong Kong and uses it to raise revenue. Keeping property prices high allows the government to keep taxes low. These policies have benefited a handful of tycoons who purchased land while it was still cheap and now own much of Hong Kong’s real estate, utilities, and transportation. In addition, environmentalists prevent the construction of housing on large portions of parkland. Mainland Chinese also buy up apartments as investments, decreasing the supply for locals.

While the older generations were able to buy property while it was still affordable, young people feel priced out of their city. Francis Yip, a professor at the Divinity School of Chung Chi College at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, describes the economy as free but not just. “In Hong Kong we don’t have real democracy, so the government does not need to seriously take into consideration the view of the voter,” Yip said. “They just do nothing … as long as there is no social disruption.”

Also concerning is the tightening noose around the free press in Hong Kong. In December, Chinese tech company Alibaba bought out Hong Kong’s revered English-language South China Morning Post. While the newspaper still covers a wide range of news, its editorial pages now reflect party lines, and the company recently closed the newspaper’s Chinese-language website and deleted its archives.

Publishers must also practice self-censorship: Chinese officials late last year kidnapped five booksellers for their work on gossipy books about China’s top leaders. One bookseller revealed that while detained, authorities psychologically tortured him and forced him to make a false confession on television.

The government also halted short-term missions trips to China and stopped many mainland Christians from crossing the border to attend evangelical meetings in Hong Kong. Officials even summoned Hong Kong pastor Philip Woo to Shenzhen last year, ordering him to stop training mainland students.

SOME BELIEVE China’s heavy-handedness with Hong Kong has come as the territory’s importance has waned. China’s economy saw unprecedented growth in the past two decades, leaving Hong Kong in the dust: Today Hong Kong’s GDP is only 3 percent of China’s, and China has formed its own trade partners. With more countries economically dependent on China, fewer countries are willing to speak out against Beijing’s treatment of Hong Kong.

Upset with the current state of affairs, 2.2 million people—58 percent of registered voters—turned out to vote for the Legislative Council in September, the highest turnout since the handover. In Hong Kong’s semi-democratic system, the people elect 35 of the 70 seats, while pro-China interest groups elect the other 35. Pro-democracy candidates maintained their veto power by winning more than a third of the seats.

Most surprisingly, a new group of voters born out of the Umbrella Movement showed its strength by voting for six localists who supported either a referendum to decide the region’s future or complete independence from China. Both options have Beijing and older Hong Kongers reeling—many parents and grandparents watched as China rose from the depths of the Cultural Revolution to a world power and saw their living standards rise with it. Rather than focus on politics, they kept their heads down and made money.

But Hong Kongers of the younger generation came of age after the handover and only see China constricting Hong Kong’s freedoms. They don’t identify as Chinese and worry about their future as they’ll be entering middle age—and leading Hong Kong—by the time the territory reunifies with China in 2047. Some groups even encourage violence in their fight for independence: They believe peaceful protests are ineffective against Beijing.

Former Cardinal Zen believes violence may be exactly what China wants. “If there is violence, then they can also use violence and have more power,” he said. “But in violence, we will never win.”

YIP, THE CHUNG CHI College professor, believes that even if Hong Kong’s GDP pales in comparison with the mainland, its value lies in something deeper than dollar signs. “The most important asset of Hong Kong is not just the institution or structure, but also its culture,” Yip said. “People work hard, they are lawful, and because of influence of the British system, there has been a general regard for freedom and the rule of law.”

This moral quality continues to attract mainlanders and even government officials to Hong Kong. China stands to lose out on the benefits of freedom if Hong Kong becomes just another Chinese city.