Does everyone really want abundance?

Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson are talented writers, two individuals unafraid to question conventional orthodoxies. This makes their new book, Abundance (Simon & Schuster, 304 pp.), all the more disappointing.

The authors’ core thesis—that America needs to create, make, and build more while eliminating self-imposed barriers that hinder economic and technological progress—sounds compelling at first. The pair’s emphasis on the necessity for an outcomes-based approach instead of ideological purity is spot-on. Klein and Thompson correctly identify that modern American progressivism has become more adept at preventing action than facilitating it—more reactive than proactive. They highlight the failure of major progressive-led initiatives, such as California’s high-speed rail, which has absorbed billions without actually producing anything of substance. They also recognize the fact that progressives’ words often contradict their actions. For instance, cities governed by Democrats often struggle to offer affordable housing, despite their leaders claiming to be genuinely concerned about ordinary Americans, especially minority groups. The authors’ emphasis on shifting from proceduralism to outcomes—focusing on what is actually built rather than the amount of money spent—offers a much overdue critique of modern governance.

However, Klein and Thompson’s proposed solutions consistently lack depth. Their analysis does not fully grasp the fundamental reasons behind the shortcomings of those on the left.

“To have the future we want, we need to build and invent more of what we need,” the authors write. “The story of America in the 21st century is the story of chosen scarcities. Recognizing that these scarcities are chosen—that we could choose otherwise—is thrilling. Confronting the reasons we choose otherwise is maddening.” While the points are valid, they fail to address why these scarcities persist. The issue, I suggest, isn’t merely about poor decision-making; it stems from an ideological aversion to growth that is deeply rooted in the progressive movement itself.

Klein and Thompson naively propose an “abundance agenda” without fully grappling with the dogmatic, doctrinal resistance that exists within their own political camp. They treat progressive obstructionism as a mere technical error, an unfortunate by-product of well-intentioned policies. They are wrong. Much of the regulatory bloat and bureaucratic inertia that stifles development is deeply embedded and often deliberate. It’s a feature, not a bug. Many progressives see economic abundance as inherently unjust, reinforcing class inequalities.

The aversion to abundance and the desire to associate capitalism with the patriarchy bolster those in power by making genuine change almost impossible. This isn’t hyperbole. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez—arguably the most influential voice on the left—has called capitalism “irredeemable.” If that’s true (which it’s not), how is anything supposed to be built? How is progress supposed to take place? The only abundance that communism has ever provided is an abundance of suffering and misery.

Moreover, their call to action is frustratingly vague. They argue that we should focus on what works rather than ideological battles. In doing so, however, they fail to recognize that ideology determines what is considered a viable solution.

Deregulation may be the most effective way to increase housing supply, but progressive cities remain ideologically opposed to market-driven solutions. Klein and Thompson suggest that the left should embrace an FDR-style approach to government action, yet they do not confront the fact that today’s progressives are fundamentally different from those of the New Deal era. They are more interested in redistribution than production, more fixated on identity-based equity than broad-based economic growth. This is the party of AOC, not FDR.

The modern left isn’t rallying around grand public works or industrial expansion; it’s consumed by petty purity tests and zero-sum politics. That detachment from economic reality played a decisive role in Donald Trump’s 2024 victory. While Democrats fixated on ever-narrower ideological litmus tests and fought over who was the most oppressed, everyday Americans looked on in bewilderment. Struggling with inflation, job insecurity, and crime, they saw no champion in a party that treated their concerns as secondary to its cultural obsessions. The left bet that fear-mongering about “threats to democracy” would be enough to overcome voters’ daily struggles. But it only highlighted their inability—or refusal—to engage with objective reality.

The authors’ reluctance to take a firm stance on the role of the private sector further weakens their argument. They suggest that government and markets should work together but fail to articulate how this should happen in practice. Should the government reduce barriers to private development? Should it take on more direct control? They hedge their bets, leaving their “abundance agenda” open to interpretation. This lack of clarity enables their ideas to be co-opted by both deregulation advocates and big-government proponents, essentially neutralizing the strength of their vision. Progressivism’s hostility toward true progress means that even when the movement controls the government, it remains paralyzed by its own ideological contradictions. This important fact seems to be lost on Klein and Thompson.