The Middle East after Assad

One of the Middle East’s most vicious tyrants has fallen from power. Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, responsible for the deaths of some 500,000 of his own people over the past 13 years, has fled with his family to Russia in disgrace and defeat. Syria now appears like it will be ruled by a menagerie of rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

The Middle East never ceases to surprise, and few if anyone saw this coming. Like his equally brutal father, Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad is a member of a Shiite sect known as Alawites, who comprise a small minority of Syria’s population but had ruled the country for a combined half-century of terror, thanks in part to support from Moscow and Tehran.

More than a decade ago, when the “Arab Spring” regionwide uprising against dictators led to a popular revolt against the Assad regime and then-President Barack Obama declared, “Assad must go,” the Syrian leader defied many predictions of his demise and crushed his opposition. The Obama administration tried to pursue a middle course of modest backing for some of the rebels while avoiding full support or direct U.S. intervention. This uncertain policy led to one of the more humiliating episodes in Obama’s presidency when he declared that any use by Assad of weapons of mass destruction was a “red line” that would trigger U.S. retaliation—yet quickly refused to respond when Assad called his bluff by slaughtering his own people with chemical weapons.

Assad’s bloodthirsty ruthlessness, combined with his patron Vladimir Putin’s intervention in 2015 with Russian forces to bolster his rule, had combined to defeat the rebel groups and solidify his hold on power in an eastern swath of his country stretching from Aleppo to Homs to Damascus.

Or so it seemed at the time. But hardly anything is permanent in geopolitics, especially in the Middle East. For the past several years, Assad had relied on the backing of Iran and Russia to secure and maintain his rule. A motley crew of rebel groups—some of them Syrian nationalists, others dissident Kurds, and still others militant Sunni jihadists—had continued to oppose his forces while seeming to make little progress on the battlefield.

At least that was true until two weeks ago when a sudden rebel surge swiftly took control of Syria’s main cities and sent Assad and his family fleeing into Russia exile. Why the change? It stems most directly from Israel’s recent offensives against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran itself. Most importantly, Jerusalem has so weakened Hezbollah that the terrorist group can no longer help protect the Assad regime. The other notable factor is a Russia enervated by three grinding years of war against Ukraine, including some 700,000 Russian casualties killed or wounded, became powerless to respond to Assad’s pleas for help last week.

One of my foreign policy principles is that what happens in one region rarely stays in that region. A Russia weakened by its foolish quagmire in Ukraine now watches helplessly as its main Middle Eastern ally falls, and with him it also likely loses its cherished naval and air bases in Syria.

There is much justice in Assad’s departure. He was an enemy of the United States, an enemy of Israel, and a despot of surpassing wickedness.

However, any joy in his capitulation should be tempered by concern for what comes next. HTS remains designated by the United States as a terrorist group and has an unsavory past. Yet, who or what the organization is now remains unclear. HTS’s leader broke with the Islamic State group in 2012 and then separated from al-Qaeda in 2016. He now claims to respect pluralism and minority rights—which may be true, or it may be a ruse disguising a coming reign of terror. How HTS will rule Syria, or at least how it will partner with other rebel groups in governing the fragile country, remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, Turkey, a longtime opponent of Assad and supporter of several Syrian opposition groups, seems to be the most immediate beneficiary in the region’s shifting power balances. Turkish influence is ascendant, while Ankara’s longtime foes Iran and Russia are weakened by the demise of their client regime.

Israel now has the edge over its regional enemies, for its multifront counteroffensives since the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas surprise attack have now succeeded in weakening Hamas, weakening Hezbollah, taking down Assad, and weakening Iran. Israel did well to disregard the Biden administration’s counsels of restraint and instead vigorously protect its security by such targeted offensives.

What should the United States do? Our initial posture has consisted of some cruise missile attacks against suspected ISIS targets in Syria, coupled with a general posture of restraint and quiet satisfaction that Assad is gone. That seems prudent for now. In the days and weeks to come, the United States needs to watch carefully to see if HTS turns terrorist while taking quiet steps to prevent any resurgent conflict from spilling over into regional partners such as Jordan and Iraq. Much remains to be written in this unfolding story.