Iran’s projection of power

Israeli intelligence and military personnel have enjoyed high-caliber wins of late. These include the three August strikes that killed senior Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, and Hamas military wing chief Mohammed Deif. September brought the audaciously inventive—and effective—episode involving exploding beepers. Soon after, a series of airstrikes systematically devasted Hezbollah’s senior leadership, including a single hit that eliminated 16 bigwigs from the elite Radwan Brigade, including Ibrahim Aqil, a player in the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing that killed 241 U.S. Marines. Last week, Hassan Nasrallah, the key figure responsible for turning Hezbollah into a formidable political and military force, was killed when Israeli fighter jets dropped a succession of specially tailored bombs that drilled down through the earth, one after the other, until penetrating Nasrallah’s bunker 60 feet below. These last detonations, especially, reverberated all the way to Tehran, Iran.

Nasrallah was the hand-picked lackey of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who in 1992 installed Nasrallah as Hezbollah’s leader. Nasrallah rose to become not only the leader of one of the world’s most lethal terrorist organizations but also a political figure with significant religious, financial, and governing responsibilities. For the last three decades, he was Iran’s premier asset in the Arab world.

We didn’t have long to wait to see whether—or how—the mullahs would respond. Tuesday night, Iran fired a salvo of nearly 200 ballistic missiles targeting a pair of Israeli military bases and Mossad headquarters. It was only the second time Tehran had directly attacked Israel. Israeli and U.S. Navy missile defense systems intercepted most of the missiles. The few that got through did little damage. Two Israelis were injured. One person was killed—ironically, a Palestinian.

As with the first direct attack back in April, there is reason to wonder whether Iran intentionally telegraphed the impending strike to allow Israel to deal effectively with it—suggesting a desire to limit damage and retaliation. The Iranian regime certainly took care to signal its motivation, releasing a war room video of Revolutionary Guard Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami ordering the missile strike while standing before images of Haniyeh, Nasrallah, and Quds Force commander Brig. Gen. Abbas Nilforoushan, who was killed alongside Nasrallah. The picture really is worth a thousand words.

In relations between adversarial nations, power projection—the ability to apply elements of political, economic, informational, or military power to effectively deploy forces to respond to crises, contribute to deterrence, and stabilize regions in accord with national interests—is essential, and Iran’s is hugely dependent on the health of its proxies. In view of its closet proxies in its fight against Israel, the present situation is not in Tehran’s favor. Hamas is not destroyed but might well be on the cusp. Meanwhile, Israel is systematically battering Hezbollah. Regarding leadership, the terror group has lost essentially everyone who matters. Its rank and file are maimed and hurting. Israel’s intelligence successes have hampered operational efficiency and communications and have likely sown distrust throughout the organization. Make no mistake: Hezbollah remains dangerous. It has a lot of fight left and massive reserves of weaponry to fuel that fight. But unlike in April, Israel doesn’t presently need to fear that a retaliatory strike against Iran might ignite a major clash with Hezbollah. After nearly a year of daily Hezbollah rocket attacks, Israeli leaders decided to ignite that clash themselves. Now, the Hezbollah threat, while not absent, is far more manageable.

This frames Iran’s dilemma. If its primary proxies no longer function as a reliable deterrent against an Israeli attack, then the mullahs must take extreme care not to provoke such an attack. But such self-preserving restraint is not cost-free. By declining to respond to Israeli battlefield successes with sufficient force, Iran risks lowering the perceived costs to Israel of continuing to pursue that success. This would set in motion a vicious cycle. The more Israel degrades Iran’s proxies, the further Iran’s power projection is degraded and the more vulnerable Tehran becomes. A vulnerable Tehran is less likely to support its proxies. And so on.

Alternatively, launching a more intense response that exacts a heavier cost to Israel may succeed in deterring Tel Aviv from further action and might restore or bolster Tehran’s legitimacy with its beleaguered proxies. But a misstep risks triggering a full-scale fight with Israel that Tehran simply cannot win. Every option carries risks to Iran’s domestic security—and invites threats to its nuclear program—and, thereby, the regime’s stability.

Through the battering of its proxies, especially Hezbollah, Iran has suffered humiliation and tactical defeats that threaten to fester into strategic ones. They will want vengeance and a rebalancing. The question is whether they are willing to pay for it.

Much depends on Tehran’s desire to survive being greater than its zeal to hurt Israel.