How will we respond to Iran?

Three American soldiers were killed and at least 40 wounded Sunday when a Tehran-backed militant group attacked a logistics support base in Jordan near the Syrian and Iraqi borders. Since the launch of fighting between Israel and Hamas in October, attacks against American installations in and around Iraq and Syria have increased in tempo, totaling more than 160. Sunday’s attack, however, was the first to result in the direct deaths of U.S. warfighters.

Since the uptick in attacks began, Washington has carried out limited retaliatory strikes against various regional militant groups. These strikes have obviously failed to deter further aggression. After Sunday, the Biden administration is facing demands to take stronger, more decisive action directly against the Iranian mullahs. As I’ve written here before, this isn’t a simple proposition. While American political and military leaders certainly have a moral duty to protect Americans—including forward deployed forces—and while it’s probably true that the Iranian regime will back down only if directly confronted by credible American power, it’s also true that Washington has a responsibility not to unnecessarily escalate low-level conflict to full-blown war. Managing all these factors is tricky.

Tehran, meanwhile, has denied any responsibility. Instead, a loose coalition of militant groups, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), appears to have taken credit for the attack. Why the ambiguity? Because while the IRI claims to have recently targeted U.S. personnel at locations near the Iraq, Syria, and Jordan borders, they do not specifically claim the attack that killed the U.S. troops. This ambiguity is strategic. Newly formed in October, the IRI is an umbrella label to describe the operations of all the Tehran-backed militias in Iraq. By intentionally obscuring which exact groups are behind attacks, the IRI allows individual armed groups a level of plausible deniability even as they pursue joint efforts to drive the United States out of the region and to erode support for Israel. According to one intelligence assessment, the generic, no-logo IRI brand is a duplicate of Tehran’s “façade strategy,” a move long employed by Iran and its proxies to obscure direct accountability for attacks against American assets. 

Iran further insulates itself from direct responsibility for what its strategic partners do by allowing them to maintain autonomy, even as they share objectives. Tehran provides essential resources, training, and coordination, but proxy groups largely maintain their own agendas. However, this is what makes the IRI so conspicuous.

Observers note that, historically, Iraqi militant groups tended to jealously guard the credit they derive from attacks. Their recent willingness to subordinate this tendency and to set aside long-running feuds over local leadership —and instead “report for duty” as one force—strongly suggests that a powerful regional player is corralling them and compelling them to get along together. That this silent backer can only be the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force means a deeper Iranian involvement than acknowledged.

Analysis helping to craft a carefully tailored U.S. response is just beginning, but several points already seem clear. First, while definitive attribution is important, it is neither strategically nor morally essential. Against assertions that the United States must identify precisely which IRI proxy is responsible before we can strike back, the coalition can instead be treated as a whole. One known faction within the alliance can be targeted and pounded until it is destroyed. Move on from faction to faction until either IRI’s desire or ability—or both—to harm Americans ceases to exist.

Secondly, none of this means the United States should indulge the feel-tough demands for an open attack on Tehran. But avoiding direct confrontation does not mean leaving the regime alone. Identify those things the mullahs value and harm some of them. This ought not to be something so essential that they cannot accept its loss. The aim is to hurt them, not pose a critical threat. The disruptive and psychological shock that followed the killing of Qods Force Commander Qasem Soleimani might be instructive. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard has numerous assets outside of Iran. They are critical to Tehran maintaining influence in the region. And the United States can reach them. If necessary, this can be done in the dark. U.S. covert resources means Tehran is not the only regime that can cultivate plausible deniability.

Lastly, we need to remember that the aim of retaliation is to reduce threats to U.S. assets, not increase them. With an embassy in Baghdad and more than 3,000 U.S. warfighters in and around Iraq and Syria, Tehran-backed militants in the region have a target-rich environment. We must step up measures to ensure our people are well protected as we potentially enter a dangerous new phase.

Until now, Tehran and its proxies have remained undeterred. They have been taught that attacking the United States is a low-risk pastime. It is time the lesson changed.