Bad timing in the Middle East

For any sitting U.S. president in our generation, there might be no greater accomplishment—in terms of Middle Eastern policy—than initiating and leading a deal to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. After all, in the Middle East, Israel is the most important U.S. ally and Saudi Arabia is the most influential Arab Muslim nation. Such a deal would likely bring significant peace in a boiling region and would be a huge achievement.

President Donald J. Trump almost did it, and one of his significant foreign policy achievements was the brokering of the Abraham Accords, which led to the normalization of relations between Israel and five Arab Muslim nations in 2020. Nothing would have been done in these deals without Saudi Arabia’s blessing, a fact that led many to hope the Saudi kingdom would follow course.

It is no secret that President Joe Biden wants to accomplish such a deal, but will he be able to do it?

According to The Wall Street Journal, “a normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia has become a priority for President Biden.” We are told that his administration is engaged in talks and “is deeply involved in the complex negotiations.”

Of course, the American side reported (or leaked) news of these complex negotiations, as the Saudi side doesn’t normally elaborate about these matters. Talking about them could create religious and geopolitical problems, due to the sensitive status of Israel in the region and the status of Saudi Arabia among Muslims. Thus, the reporting of these talks sought to score political points for the Biden administration, although, from what appears in the political arena, we should be highly skeptical any normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia can occur soon.

This isn’t a prediction, not at all. It is a mere reading of the scene in the Middle East.

The picture is starkly clear especially as Saudi Arabia, according to the Journal, insists on extraordinarily difficult conditions for a normalization deal to happen. The Saudis demand not only U.S. “security guarantees and nuclear aid” but also to be named “a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally.” “The move,” according to the Journal, “would formally make Saudi Arabia a U.S. ally and give it easier access to American weaponry.” These conditions are rightly labeled by the Journal as “daunting obstacles to a deal,” and lawmakers from both parties will most likely oppose all or some of them.

The Saudis’ conditions are basically an indicator that they have nothing to lose and, without the guarantees they want, a deal isn’t worth it. Simply, the timing isn’t right. Moreover, in current circumstances, the Saudis also have nothing urgent to gain.

The incentives of a normalization deal may not be high enough for Saudi Arabia to move forward. There are basically no unique political or economic incentives that may appeal to the Saudis at this stage. This is why the kingdom raised the stakes by asking too much—if they did gain what they seek, the deal surely be worth it.

But Saudi Arabia is also reluctant because there are possible risks if a deal with Israel goes forward. First, it may backfire inside Saudi Arabia, as about 40 percent of Saudis opposed the deal as recently as 2022. The number was 91 percent in 2014, so opposition dropped significantly, but it is still relatively high. That represents a huge political risk for the regime.

Second, a deal with Israel may complicate Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical relations with the second most important Muslim nation, Iran, especially as Saudi-Iran relations have been showing slight improvement recently, after years of growing tension. Third, if the United States brokered the Israeli-Saudi deal, then Saudi relations with China and Russia could get complicated, as both countries are seeking to replace the traditional role the United States played for decades as the major power in the region.

So, any deal faces significant hurdles.

But a normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia takes on a different perspective if seen in light of the ambition and determination of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS). A deal, the logic goes, must carry his fingerprint and gain him praise and esteem. While he seems to want to change the perception of Saudi Arabia in the world, placing it as a modern nation and distancing it from traditional Islamic cultures, he isn’t enthusiastic about Biden’s leadership and would likely avoid granting him such a remarkable achievement. The Saudis still feel the sting of Biden’s decision to show them the cold shoulder.

Without a doubt, a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia would transform Middle East geopolitics, but, with all these considerations, this deal isn’t likely to happen soon. Still, it is important to think through what such a deal would mean—and what it might take.