A tiny strait with big influence

The Strait of Hormuz has suddenly become the central territory in the ongoing war between Iran and the United States and Israel. This narrow channel—barely 21 miles across at its tightest point—is no obscure spot on a map. It is the only exit from the Persian Gulf for the oil that powers modern civilization. Roughly 20–25% of all seaborne oil traded globally passes through the passage daily, with 15–20 million barrels of oil bound mostly for the factories, power plants, and vehicles of Asia, along with significant volumes of liquefied natural gas.

When Iran threatens to close the strait with mines, missiles, and drone swarms, it is not merely flexing military and tactical muscle—it is attempting to strangle the global economy.

Maritime chokepoints have always been decisive in war because 80–90% of world trade moves by sea. History proves it repeatedly.

During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the Tanker War saw both sides attack hundreds of oil carriers in and around Hormuz. Insurance premiums skyrocketed overnight and oil prices swung wildly. Egypt’s two closures of the Suez Canal, in 1956 and 1967, forced tankers to take the long route around Africa and sent shipping costs through the roof. More recently, from 2023 to 2025, the terrorist Houthi militants used cheap missiles and drones in the Red Sea to force major shipping lines off the Suez route entirely, stretching Asia-to-Europe voyages by 10 to 14 days and straining global supply chains. That was a preview of what Iran is attempting at Hormuz today—only on a far larger scale.

The Strait of Hormuz is the single most valuable chokepoint on earth right now. Even the mere threat of closure spikes insurance rates by 300% or more, deters commercial shipping, and creates a de facto blockade without a single shot fired.

For Iran, this is the cheapest and most effective form of strategic coercion available—and it may be their last card to play. Tehran knows it cannot win a conventional fight against American and Israeli firepower. So it has chosen this narrow passage as its weapon, using mines and mobile missiles to inflict maximum pain on the world while bleeding as little as possible itself.

The question every leader in Washington must now answer is straightforward: what next?

The United States has formally asked NATO allies to stand up a multinational Maritime Security Task Force to secure the strait. Washington cannot sustain the required surface combatants and continuous carrier air cover alone—the burden must be shared. Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium are being asked to contribute destroyers, frigates, and mine-clearing squadrons, with NATO surveillance aircraft providing round-the-clock coverage.

The mission would be clear: Escort tankers, sweep mines, and keep the artery open before the global economy seizes up.

Several NATO capitals—Germany and Turkey especially—are dragging their feet, largely because of residual energy ties to Iran and fear of Chinese economic retaliation. This reluctance explains why Washington has threatened to cancel the upcoming summit between President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The strategy is to use diplomatic pressure to fracture the Russia-China-Iran axis while spreading the military burden so the world’s most critical energy corridor stays open with minimal American blood and treasure. Beijing buys the vast majority of Iran’s oil, supplies key components for its drones and missiles, and quietly enables Tehran’s campaign while playing only for its own advantage. Threatening the highest-level bilateral summit is classic coercive diplomacy—it tells China that continued support for Iran could carry a steep price in trade, technology, and Pacific stability.

However, not everyone agrees. Some progressives call the NATO request a dangerous trap that risks dragging the alliance into another open-ended Middle East conflict. They dismiss the Trump-Xi summit threat as reckless escalation that could push China closer to Tehran and Moscow. One wonders how these voices can oppose the use of American leverage, power, and alliances at the very moment those advantages could hasten the war’s end. It sometimes feels as though they would sooner see America weakened than see Iran’s strategy defeated.

Sharper strategic minds—those who remember history rather than wish it away—see it differently: NATO must neutralize Iran’s control of Hormuz now. The only language Iran truly understands is overwhelming force paired with relentless economic pressure. Anything less repeats the mistakes of past decades and invites Tehran to believe it can still dictate terms to the world.

If the United States and its allies move decisively—combining NATO muscle in the strait with hard diplomatic leverage on China—they can turn Iran’s last strategic card into a liability.

Hesitation, on the other hand, invites the chaos we cannot afford.